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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that the envisaged role for domestic metering in conserving and 
reducing the demands placed upon water resources should be subject to more open and 
critical debate. Such debate is central to ensuring that related financial resources are 
targeted in the most effective and efficient way possible. The paper challenges the ability 
of metering to regulate water demand in an effective, ethical, and equitable manner. In 
particular, attention is drawn to: the disproportional impact metered charging can have 
upon lower income groups; the long-term effects of domestic metering being poorly 
understood; the vacuous bubble within which the economic rationale underpinning 
metering exists, and how this bubble in turn ignores the reality of daily politics; the costs 
of fitting and then renewing meters; and the inaccessibility of meters being such that they 
do not readily remind the consumer of their usage levels. 
 
It is concluded that policy makers should reflect carefully on the use of metering, 
particularly when financial resources are subject to competing demands in relation to the 
need to improve the quality, access, and availability of water resources within society. 
While it is not suggested that domestic metering is abandoned altogether, it is argued that 
more careful consideration should be given to when and where households are metered. 
Instead, it is asserted that the consumers of water services should have their water usage 
controlled by stealth and lower cost methods. They should also be exposed to increased 
education in relation to the benefits of using water efficiently. Stealth measures are 
interpreted as referring to a more assertive role for government regulation in relation to 
the water efficiency of households, and the development of new water resources.  
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INTRODUCTION 
With world demand for water resources constantly increasing and showing no sign of 
abatement, the metering of domestic water supplies is often heralded as being central to 
reducing the demand for water resources (Chambouleyron, 1995; EC, 2002; UNESCO, 
2003; WaterVoice, 2004). Within the context of the United Kingdom, none more so are 
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water resources under particular strain than in the south-east of England (Anon, 2006a 
and b; CCWater, 2006). In the context of developing countries, and the poorer societal 
sections of developed countries, expenditure on drinking water accounts for a larger 
percentage of financial outgoings (Ekins and Dresner, 2004). This in turn raises an ethical 
issue of how the world’s governing institutions should be seeking to provide the poorest 
sections of society with access to drinking water if, as proven, metered charging 
adversely affects poorer sections of society.   
 
The fundamental criticism of metering has been citied to rest in the potential impact 
universal metering can have on those on low incomes (NCC, 2002; Ofwat, 2005; MTP, 
2006). The costs involved in universal metering would mean increased charges for all 
consumers with heavy usage being penalized by increased charges. While many would be 
able to manage these increased charges and be willing to pay them, there will be certain 
sections of society (for example, those with large families and those with certain medical 
conditions) that may be unable to meet increase charges. Indeed, is it equitable, or 
ethically right, that the poorer and less able sections of society should pay proportionally 
more for something that is regarded by many as a right (see McDonald and Jehl, 2003; 
Holland, 2005).   
 
Even if it is accepted that metering is suitable and we should pay in accordance with our 
usage, how can water allowances be adjusted to take account of an individuals changing 
needs and aspirations, even when their ability to pay remains restricted. However, as this 
paper contends, the criticisms surrounding metering go much deeper. It is argued that the 
envisaged role for domestic metering in conserving and reducing water demand is flawed 
in numerous respects. In particular, it is argued that metering is flawed because its long-
term impacts are unknown, it is costly, and it is devoid of the political realities that 
surround water usage. A series of alternative measures, such as a water efficiency 
appliance rating scheme and the subsidization of water efficient devices are outlined as 
alternatives to metering. It is concluded government and the water industry should play a 
much stronger role in encouraging and forcing increased water efficiency by stealth.  
 
This paper is split into four main sections that seek to highlight the inability of metering 
to regulate water demand in an effective, ethical, and equitable manner. Firstly, the paper 
challenges the ability of metering to control demand in the long-term. The second section 
of the paper focuses on the vacuous bubble in which the proponents and the rationale for 
metering exist. Particular attention is drawn to the impact of politics on the management 
of water resources. The third section of the paper highlights water metering to be one of 
the most expensive ways to control the demand for water, which is argued to be an 
inefficient allocation of financial resources. Finally, the paper argues for an alternative 
approach to be adopted in controlling water demand and encouraging more sustainable 
usage of water resources. To facilitate the development of an alternative approach, a 
series of measures are proposed to encourage increased water efficiency in a more 
efficient and equitable manner.  
 
 
 
A LONG TERM VISABLE SOLUTION? 
The long-term effects of domestic metering are poorly understood (NCC, 2002; Ekins 
and Dresner, 2004; Marshallsay and Godley, 2005). In the context of the United 
Kingdom for example, it has been found that the metering of domestic users can reduce 
initial water consumption by about 10 per cent (National Metering Trials Working 
Group, 1993). However, what happens to water consumption in the long term, 
particularly when people become used to metering, and when it does not form a 
particularly burdensome part of domestic financial outgoings, is far from certain (Ekins 
and Dresner, 2004).  
  
Although the fitting of a water meter may encourage consumers to restrict their water 
usage initially, as time passes they may become less concerned about their usage (NCC, 
2002). This situation is complicated by many meters being fitted in inaccessible locations 
that do not remind the reader of their presence, nor facilitates ease of access that 
encourages the user to closely monitor and subsequently manage their usage. The 
estimation of water usage by water companies can then be argued to further exacerbate 
the disinterest of consumer in monitoring their water usage. If consumer have had a meter 
fitted, water companies should lead by example and frequently bill people for their actual 
usage. To estimate usage could be interpreted by consumer as the water company not 
being overly concerned about water usage thereby reinforcing consumer disinterest in 
their water usage. This situation could be assumed to become exacerbated when the costs 
of water services form a relatively insignificant part of household financial outgoings and 
not an area of outgoing to be overly concerned about (NCC, 2002). The impact the 
frequency of billing, the usability and accessibility of meters have on domestic demand, 
appears to be absent from the literature and is an area worthy of further research.  
 
 
OPERATING IN A POLITICAL FREE BUBBLE 
Although metering has been shown to regulate demand in the short-term (see WIRL, 
1998; NCC, 2002), it must be recognised, far more openly, that in reality the economic 
rationale underpinning metering is flawed in two key respects. Firstly, it is questionable 
whether it will ever be politically acceptable to price water at such a level that 
discourages use, particularly when politicians seek the support of the electorate to govern, 
and in turn manage, what many see as a right and not a need (Barlow, 2003). Secondly, if 
governments refuse to disconnect people for non-payment (Louma, 2004), which to many 
is socially just, the economic rationale of increasing charges to discourage use is 
fundamentally undermined, for people can simply refuse to pay for the services provided. 
Even where disconnection is an option to force payment for water services, such an 
approach does not sit well with the United Nations Millennium Development Goal 
(MDGs) of halving the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking 
water by 2015, for it is these people who are amongst the poorest and least able to pay 
(Hayward, 2002; WHO, 2004). While governments have set out to address the issue of 
meeting essential water needs before metered charges become applicable, such measures 
are subject to controversy (Barlow, 2003). For example, how do you determine and 
justify the basic water needs of individuals. Such needs are influenced by differing levels 
of economic development which in turn affect water consumption and, more importantly, 
shapes what society views as constituting a basic water need.  
 
Claims of political unacceptability in relation to the cost of water provided by metering 
are theoretically grounded, not flights of fantasy. The management of water and the 
associated policy process is concerned with reconciling competing and conflicting 
interests, which, if left unmanaged, may result in scarcity and contamination of a resource 
crucial to the functioning of society (Carson, 1963; Nicolson, 1993; Dzurik, 1996; 
Morris, 1996). Water, much like any other natural resource, is exploited to meet various 
human needs. Within the context of rational and public choice theories resulting conflicts 
are not too surprising. Rational choice theory views individuals’ decisions as being 
designed to get the most for least (Barnes, 1994a). In other words, individuals have 
limited resources at their disposal and adopt strategies that best facilitate their objectives, 
which can lead to conflict (Barnes, 1994a; Weale, 1992). For example, it is argued that in 
times of declining economic growth spending on social projects will be reduced, 
regardless of need, due to the predominance of economic priorities and desire of 
government to protect the wider economy (Walker, 1982).  
 
Public choice theory, when applied to various groupings in a political context (e.g. 
political parties, industry, environmental lobby groups or the government of the day), 
assumes that such groups act to protect their own interests (Barnes, 1994b). As Margaret 
Thatcher (2002: 415) summarised, the core idea in public choice theory is that ‘there is a 
vested interest behind every government act’. There are two versions of public choice 
theory that are of use in explaining the actions of government and the associated 
bureaucracy. They include the versions developed by Downs (1967) and Niskanen 
(1971). Anthony Downs (1967) essentially argues that decision making is informed by 
self-interest that has at its centre the pursuit of power, money income, prestige, and a 
desire to serve in the public interest for example (Parsons, 1999). In contrast to this 
psychological motivation, William Niskanen’s (1971) model draws upon neo-classical 
economic theory in attempting to explain the actions of governments. As a consequence, 
he suggests that those working in bureaucracies seek to maximise their budgets as a way 
of maintaining their self-interest (Parsons, 1999). In essence, rational and public choice 
theories suggest that the actions of government in relation to water resources will be 
shaped by the pursuit of self-interest designed to meet varying government objectives.  
 
Fundamental to the effective functioning of water metering is the ability of providers to 
increase charges to control demand (Chambouleyron, 2003; Chambouleyron, 2004). 
However,  the application of rational and public choice theories suggest that such price 
increases threaten the pursuit of self-interest, as such price increase would be subject to 
hostility from consumers (see Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971). Therefore, if the providers 
of water services were to increase the cost of water services to such an extent so as to 
limit the pursuit of individual self interest (that is the consumption of water), such a move 
runs the risk of consumers calling upon government to act accordingly. Therefore, it is 
questionable whether any government, which is ultimately responsible for regulating 
water services and dependent upon the electorate to govern, would allow the demand for 
water resources to be controlled by pricing a fundamental human requirement beyond the 
reach of consumers. This is situation is exacerbated in water scarce areas, such as the 
south-east of England, where the problem of water shortages are not necessarily caused 
by over usage but by the underdevelopment of sufficient resources. Therefore, to fail to 
meet demand within the context of a free market democracy, and then to try to rectify this 
failure by pricing a key commodity out of the reach of consumers, increases the risk of a 
public backlash that will force politicians to act if they wish to continue to govern.   
The decision of the economic regulator (Ofwat) in England/Wales is meant to be 
independent. However, the serving government minister is potentially able to influence 
price charged for water services. This is evidenced by the guidance reports issued. For 
example, the principal guidance document issued for the current price review states: 
 
‘The main decisions on Government policies for this periodic review have been 
made in this guidance and they will stand. Companies’ final business plans, the 
draft price limits published by Ofwat and their implications for customers’ bills, 
any further advice from the regulators and the regulatory impact assessment 
that Defra will prepare will inform any further adjustments that the Secretary of 
State may choose to make to policies in the final guidance planned for Autumn 
2004’ (DEFRA, 2004: 9). 
 
The claim that government can and will aim to control the decisions of the economic 
regulator, is reinforced by the comments of the current Labour Government: 
 
‘Ministers are better placed than an independent economic regulator to 
consider the acceptability of social impact on consumers’ (DETR 2000: 2.18) 
 
The above discussion has shown, metering and its proponents live in a political free 
bubble. The existence of party politics and consumer politick calls in question the ability 
of metering to effectively control water demand in the long-term. It will not be politically 
justifiable to price water out of the reach of consumers, particularly if water companies 
are shown not to have developed sufficient resources to meet demand.  
 
 
WASTING A PRECIOUS RESOURCE 
Just as much as safe and accessible drinking water is not limitless, so are the financial 
resources of the water industry. More importantly, the financial resources of consumers 
are not limitless. Such consumers have the right to expect water services to be delivered 
at least cost, particularly in a society underpinned by markets economics (see for 
example, Jacobs, 1991; Hodge, 1995; Dixon et al. 1996; Dryzek, 2005).  
 
Although the installation of water meters has the potential to encourage a more efficient 
usage of water, it is not the most cost effective approach (NCC, 2002). According to the 
National Consumer Council discussion report entitled ‘Towards a Sustainable Water 
Charging Policy’, the demand management cost of compulsory water metering is 94 
pence per cubic meter, with voluntary metering costing 113 pence per cubic meter. These 
costs contrast markedly with the costs for other demand management measures. For 
example, the cost of converting a nine litre lavatory cistern to seven and a half litres costs 
27.2 pence per cubic meter, with the conversion of a nine litre cistern to a dual flush 
costing 17.2 pence per litre (NCC, 2002).  
The costs associated with fitting domestic meters have not remained stable. Fitting costs 
have increased by a staggering 63 per cent between 2000/01 and 2005 (Ofwat, 1998; 
2005). For 2000/01, Ofwat estimated that the average cost of fitting an optional meter to 
be £119 pounds (Ofwat, 1998). However, by 2005 Ofwat estimated that the average cost 
of an optional meter to be around £194 pounds outside the south east. In the south east 
the average cost was higher at £226 (Ofwat, 2005). Therefore, the increased fitting of 
water meters does not appear to be lowering the unit cost associated with such fittings. 
Further underlining the costs associated with fitting water meters, a 2004 Ofwat report 
highlighted that water company forecasts in England/Wales to include capital expenditure 
of £239 million to provide 1.3 million meters on request.  This cost was accompanied by 
an increase in annual operating expenditure of £11 million between 2003-04 and 2009-10 
(Ofwat 2004). It is important to remember that the costs associated with metering are not 
one-off but recurrent. The average life span of a meter is 10 years (NCC, 2002).  
 
Encouraging domestic water users to have a meter fitted because it could save them 
money is to misrepresent the economic and obligatory rationale behind charging 
consumers in relation to demand. While it is perfectly correct to suggest that a single 
occupant living in a property with a high ratable value will save money (Ofwat, 2006), 
this financial saving does not automatically translate into increased water efficient 
behaviour. Indeed, the more economically astute individual might very well increase their 
usage of water because they have become used to spending a certain amount of their 
disposable income on water services. Indeed, over a period of time, because their water 
bill may have initially fallen they may become less concerned about their usage because 
they know that used to pay more, and that expenditure on water services forms a 
relatively small part of their financial outgoings. Indeed, research by Massarutto and 
Berbeka (1999) challenges the assumption that by increasing the cost of water you will 
decrease demand. In particular, they highlighted that a one per cent increase in 
volumetric charges would only produce a decrease in consumption of 0.1 per cent (see 
NCC, 2002). As a consequence of this elasticity of domestic demand, it is also unlikely 
that an individual will be encouraged to further lower their consumption of water by 
fitting water saving devices as their water bills have already fallen without having to do 
anything. The potential returns on any such expenditure will then be relatively small and 
will in turn not act as an incentive for further water saving measures.  
 
Finally, if the industry is intent on fitting ever more meters, industry and government 
must become more aware of how a consumer driven market economy works and what the 
consequences of failure are.  Where people are forced to have meters fitted, as in the 
supply area of the Folkestone and Dover water company in the United Kingdom, 
consumers in a market based democracy will have the expectation that their water needs 
will be met, particularly if usage is determined by ability to pay. To fail to meet demand 
while the individual is able to pay is clear sign of failure. Metering does not remove the 
obligation to meet consumer needs, it merely increases it. You can not, in a free market 
economy impose restrictions on water usage if this in turn restricts an individuals ability 
to operate effectively in a market economy. For example, it incomprehensible to imagine 
that gas and electricity companies might restrict demand regardless of an individual’s 
ability to pay. Metering does not remove the obligation on water providers to develop 
new resources to be able to meet demand. Being a monopoly industry is no defence. If 
the industry wants to operate in a free market system, it must ensure it can meet demand. 
It can not pick and choose what aspects of the economic system it wants without 
considering the needs of the consumer. For the water industry to ignore its consumer 
obligations is to challenge its right to operate.  
 
As a consequence of the discussion above, a series of fundamental question emerge. 
These questions challenge the presumption that water metering is in the interests of the 
consumer. This is particularly true in the context of England/Wales, where the consumer 
of water services must bear the full costs of water services without national or 
supranational government subsidies. As the fitting of meters do not represent the least 
cost solution to reducing demand for water resources, is it right that water consumers 
have compulsory water meters fitted? Is it right that water consumers be subject to an 
approach to demand management that appears to be subject to spiraling costs, particularly 
when the long term impacts of such technologies are unknown? It is right that consumers 
are not given the choice to adopt the least cost solution to control their usage of water, 
why force them into accepting the highest cost solution? Will it be justifiable to restrict 
demand once consumers are metered and consumption is controlled by ability to pay? 
Are the costs involved in metering not better allocated to more innovative lower cost 
solutions designed to bring about permanent water efficiency savings? 
 
 
AN ALTERNATIVE VISION 
So far this paper has argued that the metering of water users is fundamentally flawed. The 
criticisms leveled at metering leaves the author open to the fundamental criticism of 
being full of hot air, without having anything constructive to say. As a consequence, this 
paper argues that the consumers of water services should have their behavior modified by 
stealth. This should be carried out by government regulation, and initiatives, targeted at 
encouraging increased water efficiency.  
 
It is proposed that the suppliers of devices that use water should be subject to a water 
efficiency labeling scheme. This scheme could be funded by curtailing the fitting of 
domestic meters to where absolutely necessary (i.e. to high end domestic users, such as 
those with swimming pools for example). The labels could be designed in similarity with 
the EU energy label scheme. This scheme awards electrical appliances a grade from ‘A’ 
(indicating most energy efficient) to ‘G’ (indicating the lowest energy efficient) (see 
Defra, 2005). Government should then set strict limits on the water usage levels of such 
devices, with economic incentives, such as reduced Value Added Tax (VAT) for devices 
that fall within the top water efficiency category. The users of water should also become 
entitled to a rebate from the water company if they have installed certain water efficient 
devices, such as the latest water efficient washing machine. A similar scheme, to the one 
outlined above, is already being operated by Sydney Water in Australia (Sydney Water, 
2006). Consumers in the supply area of Sydney Water are able to buy a washing machine 
by ascertaining its water efficiency via a ‘star’ or ‘A’ rating system with 4 ‘stars’ or 5 
‘A’s’ indicating the most water efficient washing machine. Consumers can then claim a 
rebate of approximately £60 pounds (Sydney Water, 2006). This water efficiency 
measure will, it is estimated, save the average water user 21,000 litres a year (Sydney 
Water, 2006).  In relation to encouraging and offering a rebate on low flush toilets, such a 
measure has the potential to reduce water demand by up to seven percent (NCC, 2002). 
The aforementioned water efficiency measures also have the benefit of being far more 
permanent than water metering. The impact of metering is subject to, as highlighted 
previously, the vagaries of consumer behaviour in relation to ability to pay and a concern 
for the wider water environment. If neither of these issues are accorded a high priority by 
the consumer, it is reasonable to expect that water meters will have little effect over the 
long term.  
 
If the water industry is not willing to look at alternatives to water metering, and embrace 
more cost effective methods of reducing water consumption, then government should act 
accordingly. It should introduce schemes as outlined above. In relation to administering 
the water efficiency grading scheme, this could be delegated to the Consumer Council for 
Water which has been charged with encouraging the sustainable usage of water 
resources, by both the consumer and the water industry in England/Wales.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Policy makers should reflect carefully on the use of metering, particularly when financial 
resources are subject to competing demands in relation to the need to improve the quality, 
access, and availability of water resources within society. While it is not suggested that 
domestic metering is abandoned altogether, it is argued that more careful consideration 
should be given to lower cost solutions that are capable of bringing about permanent 
water efficiency savings. If the water industry is not willing to embrace more innovative 
solutions and to be proactive in this area, then government should act.  
 
Government should seek to control water usage by stealth. Stealth measures are 
interpreted as referring to a more assertive role for mandatory regulation in relation to the 
water efficiency of key household appliances, and the development of new water 
resources. Consumers of water services should then be exposed to more effective and 
integrated education methods designed to increase their awareness of how to use water 
efficiently. It is not enough to engage in such education efforts when water resources are 
under strain. To further the ability of the water industry and government to encourage the 
more efficient use of water resources, at least cost and within the confines of a democracy 
dominated by market economics, further research needs to be undertaken.  
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